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Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: Skirting
the "Suit Within a Suit" Requirement
of Legal Malpractice Actions
by
PAUL GARY KERKORIAN*
The legal malpractice cause of action is an important device to en-
sure quality legal service. By requiring the use of knowledge, skill, and
ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by similarly situated members
of the legal profession,' the law creates an "ordinary attorney" rather
than an "ordinary person" standard of care. The result is a higher mini-
mum standard of care for lawyers in the conduct of their profession.2
Typically, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice suit must prove by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that but for the attorney's alleged negligence, the
client would have obtained a more favorable result in her underlying
suit.3 This so-called "suit within a suit" requirement 4 forces the plaintiff
to prove her underlying case to recover from the defendant attorney for
mishandling it. This requirement can operate harshly against the plain-
tiff,5 especially when the attorney's own negligence makes subsequent
proof of the underlying case by the client more difficult or impossible.6
For example, an attorney might negligently fail to pursue discovery that
would have ensured success for his client. If the client subsequently re-
* B.A. 1986, University of California, Berkeley; Member, Third Year Class.
1. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 199, at 249 (1980).
2. 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15.1, at 854 (3d ed. 1989).
3. 7 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 1, § 223, at 266-67. The plaintiff must also prove: (1) the
existence of an attorney-client relationship, and (2) acts of the attorney constituting negligence.
Id. at 266.
4. See, e.g., Coggin, Attorney Negligence... A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV.
225 (1958); Note, Erosion of the Traditional Suit Within a Suit Requirement, 7 U. TOL. L.
REV. 328 (1975) (authored by John Michael Husband).
5. Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 666, 672 (1978) (authored by Erik M. Jensen).
6. Id. at 671. See, e.g., Lewis v. Collins, 349 So. 2d 444, 445 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (hold-
ing a "possibility" that the underlying medical malpractice cause of action was valid was insuf-
ficient to take the legal malpractice claim to the jury even though attorney's negligence made
plaintiff's production of evidence more difficult); Lewandowski v. Continental Casualty Co.,
88 Wis. 2d 271, 281-82, 276 N.W.2d 284, 289 (1979) (refusing to reduce plaintiff's burden of
proving the underlying suit even though attorney's negligence had made plaintiff's production
of evidence more difficult).
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quires such information for her malpractice case, but the passage of time
has made it unobtainable, the attorney's own negligence effectively has
insulated him from liability.
This Note proposes that the development of a new tort for negligent
spoliation of evidence may provide a useful means for plaintiffs to avoid
the harsh effects of the "suit within a suit" requirement in legal malprac-
tice suits. As the tort has been used in other contexts, a negligent spolia-
tion plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff
not to spoliate evidence; that the defendant negligently spoliated evidence
relevant to a prospective lawsuit; and that the spoliation of evidence has
caused damage to the plaintiff. This last requirement has been inter-
preted in California not to require the plaintiff to show that but for the
spoliation of evidence, the underlying suit would have reached a more
favorable result.7 Instead, California courts see the damage as an injury
to the expectancy of recovery, not to the recovery itself.8 Under this the-
ory, the chances that recovery would have been obtained in the underly-
ing suit in the absence of spoliation is not determinative. Consequently,
there appears to be no "suit within a suit" requirement for negligent spo-
liation actions in California. Thus, a legal malpractice plaintiff should
consider bringing a negligent spoliation action against her attorney in
addition to the malpractice action. If the attorney's negligence has im-
paired the value of evidence or caused evidence to become unavailable,
the plaintiff need not prove the merit of the underlying suit to recover.
In such cases of attorney misconduct involving spoliated evidence, the
"suit within a suit" requirement operates most harshly and could be
avoided by a negligent spoliation action.
This Note examines the new tort of negligent spoliation of evidence
as a tool for plaintiffs to sidestep the difficulties of the "suit within a suit"
requirement of legal malpractice claims. Part I explores judicial and
scholarly attempts to rectify the unfairness that may result from the "suit
within a suit" requirement. Part II looks at the new tort of negligent
spoliation of evidence. Subpart A focuses on the development of the tort
through the case law. Subpart B analyzes specific problematic aspects of
the tort, paying special attention to the use of the tort by plaintiff clients
against negligent attorneys. The Note concludes by summarizing and
synthesizing the findings.
7. See infra, notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
8. This Note will sometimes refer to "recovery" or "'expectancy of recovery." This ter-
minology refers to the situation in which the negligent spoliation plaintiff was also the plaintiff
in the underlying suit. This language is not intended, however, to limit the discussion to plain-
tiffs. It is used only for ease of communication and should be understood to refer to both
underlying plaintiffs and defendants. In other words, "expectancy of recovery" should be un-
derstood also to mean "expectancy of nonliability" as applied to defendants in the underlying
suit.
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I. Attempts to Mitigate the Harshness of the "Suit Within a
Suit" Requirement
A great majority of courts apply ordinary tort principles concerning
the standard of proof for causation in legal malpractice cases. 9 Typically,
the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for
the attorney's negligence the client would have obtained a more favorable
result in the underlying suit.10 The cases on this issue"' provide little
explanation for their positions. Instead, they seem to rely on the basic
tenets that a plaintiff must plead and prove every element essential to the
cause of action for negligence, ' 2 and that causation is one such element.1 3
In legal malpractice actions, a plaintiff must show that her underlying
suit would have been more favorable "but for" the attorney's
negligence.
14
Perhaps the fundamental nature of these concepts explains the lack
of justification for their use in legal malpractice cases. It is surprising,
however, to note that even when the attorney's alleged negligence would
make the client's proof of causation more difficult-as in cases in which
the attorney negligently allows the limitations period to pass with the
concomitant threat of impaired evidence-the courts generally have re-
mained unwilling to alter the client's burden of proof for causation. 15
This situation suggests that these courts mechanically apply the "prepon-
derance" standard without questioning its suitability for the particular
circumstances of a given case.
A few courts have strayed from the majority "preponderance" stan-
dard of causation in proving the "suit within a suit." These cases gener-
ally reflect a more examined approach to applying the burden of proof, as
well as discontent with the typical mechanical application of the "suit
within a suit" requirement. Commentators also have expressed dissatis-
9. 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 103; see also Annotation, Proximate
Cause, Necessity of Proving Damages, 45 A.L.R.2D 19-22 (1956) (citing authority for proposi-
tion that legal malpractice law follows traditional proximate cause requirement necessitating
proof of the merit of the underlying suit).
10. 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 2, § 16.4, at 896.
11. See 2 id. § 27.8, at 647 n.21.
12. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 38, at 239 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
13. Id. § 41, at 263.
14. When the plaintiff was a defendant in the underlying suit, the "but for" test asks
whether the client would have been defended more successfully but for the attorney's negli-
gence. When the plaintiff was asserting a claim in the underlying suit, the question is whether
that claim would have achieved greater success but for the attorney's negligence. In both cases
the question is best stated: Would the client have achieved a more favorable result but for the
attorney's negligence?
15. But see Sukoff v. Lemkin, 202 Cal. App. 3d 740, 744 n.4, 249 Cal. Rptr. 42, 44 n.4
(1988) (suggesting that court would have shifted burden had plaintiff alleged or shown that
any evidence was unavailable).
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faction with the majority approach and have suggested different ways to
assign the burden of proof. Both the cases and commentary are worth
reviewing.
In Baker v. Beal,16 the defendant attorneys failed to assert an essen-
tial element of their client's statutory dramshop action. 17 In the subse-
quent legal malpractice action against them, the attorneys argued that
the client's failure to prove the same element justified dismissal of the
malpractice action.1 8 The Iowa court, however, denied the motion,
stating:
We will not assume after the defendant attorneys had the case in their
office for two years they selected a statutory cause of action upon
which no relief could be granted. We hold plaintiff is entitled to the
same presumption defendants rely on in another context: everyone is
presumed to have discharged his duty, whether legal or moral, until
the contrary is made to appear.1 9
Thus, the Baker court presumed that the underlying suit was meritorious
by inferring that if the suit were unjustified, the defendant attorneys
would not have accepted and pursued the case for so long.
20
In Winter v. Brown,2 1 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
created a similar presumption but on different grounds. In Winter, the
defendant attorneys missed the statutory deadline for asserting their cli-
ents' claims against the county and its hospital.22 In the subsequent mal-
practice action, the attorneys argued that since the plaintiff clients still
could bring an action against the treating physician for which the limita-
tions period had not lapsed, they had not yet suffered any injury as a
result of the attorneys' negligence. 23 After concluding that the plaintiff
clients had a better chance of recovering against the hospital than against
the treating physician, the court stated:
[Defendant attorneys] have precipitated a situation in which the differ-
ence in value between the cause of action of which they deprived appel-
lees and the cause of action which appellees still retain against hospital
agents or employees is not subject to fair measurement or calculation.
It is they, rather than [plaintiff clients], who must bear the onus of
16. 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975).
17. Id. at 108.
18. Id. at 110.
19. Id.
20. Subsequent Iowa cases have not followed Baker in this respect. See, e.g., Burke v.
Roberson, 417 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1987); Whiteaker v. State, 382 N.W.2d 112, 114-15
(Iowa 1986); Devine v. Wilson, 373 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). But c.f Kohler v.
Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 Ill. App. 3d 455, 458, 304 N.E.2d 677, 679 (1973) (defendant
attorneys estopped from denying that plaintiff proved his claim in underlying arbitration when
attorneys continued to assert validity of arbitration award in subsequent proceedings).
21. 365 A.2d 381 (D.C. 1976).
22. Id. at 382.
23. Id. at 383.
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their error and the resultant impossibility of ascertaining the value of
what was lost.
24
In this way, the Winter court created a presumption that the underlying
claim was meritorious. In contrast to the Baker presumption, which was
based on a logical inference, this presumption appears grounded more on
basic notions of fairness. 25 Under the reasoning in Winter, the defendant
attorneys, not the plaintiff, should bear the burden of proving that ele-
ment in the malpractice action because the attorneys' negligent conduct
made it more difficult for the plaintiff to prove an element of the underly-
ing case.
26
In Walker v. Porter,27 the plaintiff client avoided a nonsuit even
though she had not proven which one of three defendant attorneys in the
underlying suit was at fault. While the court placed the burden on the
client to prove her underlying suit, 28 it noted that "[t]he trial court...
erroneously imposed upon... [her] the further burden of showing pre-
cisely which one of the three was the negligent party. ' 29 Thus, the
Walker court lightened the plaintiff client's burden of proving the merit
of the underlying case. Rather than requiring proof of the precise source
of the negligent conduct, the court deemed the existence of negligent con-
duct sufficient. As in Winter, fairness concerns seem to underlie the
court's holding. Given the plaintiff's prima facie showing of negligence
on the part of the defendant attorney 30 and at least one of the three un-
derlying defendants, 31 the court apparently felt it unjust to require the
plaintiff to prove which single underlying defendant was at fault in order
to recover in her malpractice suit.
32
24. Id. at 385 (footnote omitted).
25. The distinction in this case is commonly characterized as "presumption of fact" (seen
in Baker) and "presumption of law" (seen in Winter). See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence
§§ 161-63, at 195-98 (1967) (A presumption of fact is an inference from other established facts;
a presumption which arises from the reasonable man's experience. A presumption of law is a
mandatory presumption derived from the law of the jurisdiction; a conclusion drawn from
other facts which do not necessarily exist but which have already been proven in court.).
26. Analogous reasoning was used by a New York appellate court in a different context
in Romanian American Interests, Inc. v. Scher, 94 A.D.2d 549, 554-55, 464 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824
(1983). There the court noted that if a potentially successful affirmative defense in the under-
lying suit was lost on a failure attributable to attorney, the attorney would not be allowed to
raise this defense in a subsequent legal malpractice suit.
27. 44 Cal. App. 3d 174, 118 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974).
28. Id. at 177-78, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. The defendant attorney allowed the statute of limitations for plaintiff's action to
lapse. I'd. at 178, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
31. The plaintiff's underlying claim would have been against the county, her landlord, a
contractor, or any combination of the three, any one of which was allegedly negligent in failing
to mark a trench in the plaintiff's driveway that had been created in connection with sidewalk
repairs. The plaintiff injured herself when she fell into the trench at night. Id. at 176-77, 118
Cal. Rptr. at 468-69.
32. Id. at 177-78, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
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Another group of cases creates presumptions in malpractice suits to
maintain the allocation of the burden of proof as it existed in the underly-
ing suit. Thus, in Giuffria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 3 3 the
plaintiff client, who was the defendant in the underlying suit, succeeded
in shifting the burden of coming forward with evidence on that suit to the
defendant attorney. 34 The court reasoned that because the plaintiff client
did not have the burden of proving his defense in the underlying suit, he
should not now be forced to do so as an element of his malpractice
claim.35 Similar reasoning was used in Romanian American Interests,
Inc. v. Scher, 36 in which the court placed the burden of proof on the
defendant attorneys to show that any affirmative defenses would have
defeated the plaintiff client's underlying claim. 37 As in Guiffria, the
court in Scher sought to avoid imposing on the plaintiff client a heavier
burden for proving the merit of the underlying suit than was imposed in
the original suit.
38
One recent California case, Sukoff v. Lemkin, 39 has at least ac-
knowledged that the burden of proof for showing causation may shift to
the attorney when the attorney's own negligence has made unobtainable
evidence that could have been used to prove the underlying case.
4
0
Sukoff involved a suit against an attorney for negligently conceding post-
separation income to a husband in a dissolution trial because of a failure
to make adequate discovery of certain facts.4 1 The court held that the
plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proving that a higher award
would have been given had adequate discovery been made.4 2 The court
acknowledged, however, that when the attorney's negligence has made
such proof more difficult by making evidence unobtainable, the burden of
proof may shift to the attorney to show that a higher award could not
have been obtained even if adequate discovery had been pursued.
4 3
33. 293 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
34. Id. at 519.
35. Id. This reasoning was first enunciated in a nineteenth century English case,
although the Giuffria court did not cite it. See Godefroy v. Jay, 131 Eng. Rep. 159-60 (P.C.
1830). Analogous reasoning is found in Coopwood v. Baldwin & Gray, 25 Miss. 129, 131
(1852).
36. 94 A.D.2d 549, 464 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1983).
37. Id. at 554, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 824. The only subsequent case following this proposition
is Nitis v. Goldenthal, 128 A.D.2d 687, 688, 513 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188 (1987).
38. This reasoning is sound and it is surprising to note the lack of case law following
either Guiffria or Scher. There are no reported cases following Guiffria and only one following
Scher. See supra note 6.
39. 202 Cal. App. 3d 740, 249 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1988).
40. Id. at 744 n.4, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 44 n.4.
41. Id. at 745, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
42. Id. at 745, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
43. Id. at 744 n.4, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 44 n.4. In this particular case the plaintiff simply
failed to prove that any evidence was unobtainable.
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Commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with judicial solutions
to the problem and have suggested others. One writer has proposed the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to legal malpractice suits
involving litigation errors.44 The result would shift to the defendant at-
torney the burden of producing evidence of the underlying suit's lack of
merit once the client has proven the existence of an attorney-client rela-
tionship and the negligent loss of the action through litigation error.45
Others have proposed compensating a client for the loss of a mere chance
of recovery due to the attorney's negligence.46 According to this view,
"the chance of avoiding some adverse result, or achieving some favorable
result, is a compensable interest even if the chance is less than fifty
percent." 47
These suggestions have not been followed widely by the courts, and
the cases discussed above have not proven to be more than isolated inci-
dents of judicial creativity in dealing with the "suit within a suit" prob-
lem in legal malpractice actions. Fortunately, the development of a new
tort in California, negligent spoliation of evidence, may provide a way for
certain plaintiffs to avoid the most unfair aspects of the current law.
11. Negligent Spoliation of Evidence and Legal Malpractice
In 1983 the California Supreme Court implicitly recognized a tort
cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence.48 The tort allows a
plaintiff to recover damages when a person negligently makes unobtain-
able evidence that was to be used for civil litigation. As California law
now stands, the plaintiff need not plead or prove the merit of the underly-
ing suit.49 As a result, the negligent spoliation tort could prove ex-
tremely valuable to a legal malpractice plaintiff whose ability to prove the
merit of the underlying claim has been impaired by the attorney's negli-
gence.50 In such a case, plaintiff could claim negligent spoliation of evi-
dence in the alternative and recover damages comparable to those
awarded for legal malpractice.
44. Note, A Modern Approach to the Legal Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689, 701-04
(1977) (authored by Kenneth G. Lupo).
45. Id. at 701.
46. Note, Loss of Chance in Legal Malpractice, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1479, 1480 (1986)
(authored by Polly A. Lord). Another commentator suggests allowing recovery for a "lost
substantial possibility of recovery." Note, supra note 5, at 679.
47. Note, supra note 46, at 1479 (emphasis added).
48. Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 664 P.2d 137, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1983).
49. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
50. While intentional spoliation of evidence has been recognized as a legitimate tort,
Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984), it has only an
indirect relation to this discussion. As discussed below, this intentional tort has significance to
the evolution of the negligent spoilation tort. It is difficult, however, to imagine under what
circumstances an attorney would intentionally make evidence unavailable to his own client.
Therefore, negligent spoliation of evidence is the primary focus of this Note.
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A. Evolution of the Negligent Spoliation Tort
Before analyzing the negligent spoliation tort in the attorney-client
setting, it is useful to examine the evolution of the negligent spoliation
tort. The origins of the tort are traceable to the 1973 case of Pirocchi v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 51 In that case, the plaintiff was injured at
work when a chair on which he was sitting collapsed.52 Subsequently, an
agent of the insurance company voluntarily took possession of the chair
and allegedly caused the chair to be lost. The injured plaintiff sued the
insurance company, asserting that the failure to preserve physical evi-
dence had precluded his cause of action against the manufacturer of the
chair.53 The Pennsylvania federal district court first noted the holding in
Stupka v. Peoples Cab Co.,54 which found that a taxi company had no
duty to obtain the identity of the driver of a car that had crashed into the
taxi and injured its passengers. 55 The Pirocchi court, however, distin-
guished Stupka on the ground that Stupka concerned the imposition of
"a new affirmative duty" to preserve evidence, rather than "the recog-
nized duty to act reasonably once affirmative action has been under-
taken,"' 56 as was the situation when the insurance company's agent took
possession of the chair. The Pirocchi court denied the defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion and left the question of the insurance company's
duty to preserve the chair for the plaintiff for determination at trial.
57
The significance of the Pirocchi decision is its implicit recognition of the
negligent spoliation tort. While the existence of a duty still was unde-
cided, the court raised no objection to recovery for the lost underlying
suit, even though that suit had not yet been tried. More typical decisions
both before and after Pirocchi found the purported loss of an untried
claim to be too speculative to warrant relief.
58
Recovery for spoliation of evidence was recognized next by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in 1983 in Williams v. State.59 Williams was the
first in a line of California cases that has resulted in a dramatic expansion
of the potential application of the spoliation tort. In Willams, the plain-
tiff was injured severely when a heated brake drum from a passing truck
smashed through the windshield of her car.60 She alleged that the Cali-
fornia Highway Patrol officers who arrived at the scene negligently failed
51. 365 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
52. Id. at 279.
53. Id. at 279-80.
54. 437 Pa. 509, 264 A.2d 373 (1970).
55. Id. at 512-13, 264 A.2d at 374.
56. Pirocchi, 365 F. Supp. at 281.
57. Id. at 282.
58. See, e.g., Stupka, 437 Pa. at 514-15, 264 A.2d at 375 (Jones, J., concurring); Fox v.
Cohen, 84 Il1. App. 3d 744, 751, 406 N.E.2d 178, 183 (1980).
59. 34 Cal. 3d 18, 664 P.2d 137, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1983).
60. Id. at 21, 664 P.2d at 138, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
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to investigate the brake drum part, to identify other witnesses, and to
attempt any investigation or pursuit of the operator of the truck whose
brake drum caused the injury. 61 As a result of this negligence, the plain-
tiff claimed that her opportunity to obtain compensation for her injury
from any responsible party had been virtually destroyed.62
The court focused on whether the defendant highway patrol officers
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.63 Applying general principles of tort
law regarding when the failure to act amounts to a breach of duty, the
court concluded:
[P]laintiff has not stated a cause of action in that she fails to establish a
duty of care owed by defendant [patrol officers]. The officers did not
create the peril in which plaintiff found herself; they took no affirma-
tive action which contributed to, increased, or changed the risk which
would have otherwise existed; there is no indication that they volunta-
rily assumed any responsibility to protect plaintiff's prospects for re-
covery by civil litigation."
Many judicial and scholarly commentators have noted that the court's
holding, by making lack of duty the only grounds for failure of the claim,
impliedly recognized the validity of the plaintiff's negligent spoliation
claim.65 Had the officers only "voluntarily assumed ... responsibility to
protect plaintiff's prospects for recovery,"' 66 the negligent spoliation
cause of action might have proceeded.
Drawing on this language from Williams, the court of appeal for the
second district explicitly recognized the tort of negligent spoliation of evi-
dence in Velasco v. Commercial Building Maintenance Co.67 The plaintiff
in Velasco was injured when a bottle exploded. 68 The bottle fragments
were taken to an attorney, who placed them in a paper bag and left them
on top of his desk. 69 The plaintiff alleged that the janitors in the attor-
ney's office building "negligently ... destroyed or disposed of ... the
exploded bottle," thus preventing any chance for recovery in subsequent
product liability litigation.
70
61. Id. at 21-22, 664 P.2d at 138, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 22-28, 664 P.2d at 139-43, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 235-39.
64. Id. at 27-28, 664 P.2d at 143, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 239 (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Carden v. Getzoff, 190 Cal. App. 3d 907, 914, 235 Cal. Rptr. 698, 702
(1987); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 876, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 504, 505 (1985); Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 496-97, 198 Cal. Rptr.
829, 833 (1984); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);'Abney,
Spoilation and Future CivilActions: Slowing the Rush to a Novel Tort, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 2, 1987,
at 38; Note, Smith v. Superior Court: A New Tort of Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, 69
MINN. L. REv. 961, 968 (1985) (authored by Pati Jo Pofahl).
66. Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 27-28, 664 P.2d at 143, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
67. 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1985).




The Velasco court first cited Williams for the proposition that "a
cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence may be stated in ap-
propriate circumstances."' 7 1 The court then briefly discussed the holding
in Smith v. Superior Court,7 2 another second district case, which first rec-
ognized the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. As the Velasco
court stated, "[f]or the reasons described in Smith v. Superior Court, we
hold that a cause of action may be stated for negligent destruction of
evidence needed for prospective civil litigation."' 73 It analogized negli-
gent spoliation to the tort of negligent interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage and denied recovery due to a lack of foreseeability of
harm, a requisite element to a finding of duty.74 Velasco clearly estab-
lished the negligent spoliation tort, citing Smith v. Superior Court for the
rationales behind the tort. Consequently, one can infer many of the spe-
cifics of the negligent spoliation tort from a reading of Smith.
The intentional spoliation of evidence cause of action in Smith in-
volved a plaintiff who was injured when the wheel from a passing van
flew off and crashed through her windshield. 75 The van subsequently
was towed to Abbott Ford, the dealer that had customized the van with
"deep dish mag wheels. ' ' 76 Abbott Ford agreed with the plaintiff's attor-
ney to maintain certain automotive parts as physical evidence pending
further investigation.7 7 When Abbott Ford failed to do so, the plaintiff
brought an action for intentional spoliation of evidence. 78
In finding this claim to be valid, the court first justified the creation
of a new tort.79 It noted that an individual has a legally enforceable right
not to have evidence destroyed and cited Williams as support.8 0 The
court then dealt with the defendant's contention that no such cause of
action could be stated due to a 1959 California case, Agnew v. Parks,8 '
which denied a similar civil claim on the grounds that current obstruc-
tion of justice penal statutes preempted the field.8 2 Agnew involved a
medical malpractice plaintiff who alleged that certain members of the
county medical association had threatened other members to prevent
them from testifying, had recommended a biased expert, and had con-
cealed x-rays of the plaintiff's injuries.8 3 The Smith court distinguished
71. Id.
72. 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984).
73. Velasco, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 877-79, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
75. Smith, 151 Cal. App. at 494, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 495, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
79. Id. at 495-500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832-35.
80. Id. at 496-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
81. 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959).
82. Id. at 761, 343 P.2d at 121.
83. Id.
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Agnew on three grounds relevant here. First, unlike Agnew, the plaintiff
in Smith brought her spoliation claim before the underlying claim had
gone to trial, thus avoiding the Agnew court's concern about relitigating
issues already adjudicated.84 Second, unlike Agnew, the alleged destruc-
tion of evidence in Smith could not be deterred adequately by existing
statutes because destruction of evidence was a felony at the time of
Agnew, but only a misdemeanor at the time of Smith.8 5 The court noted
that "[i]f crucial evidence could be intentionally destroyed by a party to a
civil action who thereby stands to gain substantially monetarily by such
destruction, the effect of a misdemeanor would be of minimal deter-
rence."' 86 Finally, the court found the wrongful conduct alleged in Smith
to have involved the violation of more personal, as opposed to societal,
rights than the conduct alleged in Agnew. Consequently, both criminal
and tort remedies were deemed appropriate in Smith.
87
Having concluded that a new tort cause of action was justified, the
Smith court turned to "[tihe most troubling aspect" 88 of the intentional
spoliation tort, namely the problem of proving the fact and amount of
damages with the requisite "reasonable certainty."8 9 The court noted
two difficulties inherent in proving these elements of the spoliation tort.
First, because the underlying suit has not yet been tried, arguably no
damage has occurred. Second, even if the probable result of the underly-
ing case is determined, the amount (in monetary terms) by which the
spoliated evidence would have benefitted the plaintiff is still highly
speculative. 90
The court first addressed the amount of damages question. Though
the Smith plaintiff was unable to show the amount of damages with "rea-
sonable certainty" as traditionally is required,91 the court did not deny
relief on this ground. Instead, the court quoted a United States Supreme
Court case, Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,92
which held that in certain cases, the courts will lower the requisite stan-
dard of certainty as to the amount of damages:
[W]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertain-
ment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perver-
sion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured
person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for
his acts. In such case, while damages may not be determined by mere
84. Smith, at 498, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34.
85. Id at 499, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835. The Agnew court relied on California Penal Code
§ 135 as it existed in 1959. The Smith court relied on the same statute as it existed in 1984.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 498-99, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
88. Id. at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. D. DoBBs, REMEDIES, Damages-Equities-Restitution § 3.3, at 150 (1st ed. 1973).
92. 282 U.S. 555 (1931); see also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
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speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent
of damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the
result be only approximate. 93
The Smith holding lowered tlie requisite degree of certainty as to the
amount of damages from a standard of "reasonable certainty" to a "just
and reasonable inference." Applying this new standard, the Smith court
found that the plaintiff had shown the requisite degree of certainty re-
garding the amount of damages to state a cause of action. 94
The court then confronted the "fact of damages" question: if the
underlying claim had not yet been tried, had there been any legally com-
pensable harm? The court first mentioned that the California Supreme
Court had recognized a tort for interference with business expectations,
even when the expectations were not the subject of an enforceable agree-
ment.95 The court then cited Dean Prosser for the proposition that cer-
tain "probable expectancies" were worthy of legal protection from undue
interference. 96 The court held that the plaintiff's prospective civil action
in the case at bar was one such probable expectancy. 97 The fact that the
underlying suit had not yet been tried was held not fatal to the claim
since the court made it clear that the interest protected by the new inten-
tional spoliation tort was the opportunity to win the suit, or the "expec-
tancy," and not the suit itself.98
This distinction was crucial in the Smith court's most important
holding, namely that a negligent spoliation plaintiff need not show at the
pleading stage that her underlying suit would have been successful had
the defendant not spoliated evidence. 99 In addressing this issue, the
court looked to a 1975 California appellate case, Gold v. Los Angeles
Democratic League. 100 In Gold, an unsuccessful candidate for local office
sued the Democratic League, alleging that although he was the endorsed
candidate of the Democratic Party, the Democratic League had mailed
pamphlets the day before the election endorsing another candidate and
had conveyed the false impression that the Democratic League was an
official branch of the Democratic Party. 101 The court held that the plain-
tiff stated a cause of action for intentional interference with the plaintiff's
prospective employment.102 The Smith court applied Gold's discussion
93. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (emphasis added) (quoting
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
94. Id. at 502, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
95. Id., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
96. Id. at 501, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
97. Id. at 502, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
98. Id., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
99. Id. at 503, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
100. 49 Cal. App. 3d 365, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975).
101. Id. at 371, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37.
102. Id. at 375, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 739. The court made this holding despite the fact that
the plaintiff trailed in pre-election polls by a four to one margin.
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of the speculative nature of damages to the intentional spoliation cause of
action:
The Gold court held that the plaintiff stated an action for interference
with his opportunity to be elected to office, even though the advantage
was merely prospective ....
We find this case similar to the Smiths' situation. Abbott Ford
allegedly intentionally interfered with the Smiths' opportunity to win
their suit. The plaintiff in Gold was not required to allege at the plead-
ing stage that he would have won the election but for the defendant's
interference, but rather that the defendant had intentionally interfered
with his opportunity for a prospective advantage. We see little differ-
ence in Abbott Ford's alleged interference with the Smiths' prospective
advantage, i.e., proving their product liability suit.103
The analogy to Gold makes it clear that the Smith court saw proof of the
validity of the underlying suit in an intentional spoliation action as com-
pletely unnecessary.' °4
Williams, Smith, and Velasco outline the development of Califor-
nia's negligent spoliation tort. Williams impliedly recognized that recov-
ery could be had for spoliation of evidence. Smith followed the Williams
endorsement and allowed a cause of action for intentional spoliation of
evidence. In so holding, the Smith court lowered the degree of certainty
required in the plaintiff's showing of the amount of damages and indi-.
cated that the spoliation plaintiff need not prove the merit of the underly-
ing case. These elements make the spoliation action unique. Velasco's
recognition of a negligent spoliation cause of action further expanded the
outer reaches of the spoliation tort.
While California's negligent spoliation tort is potentially the most
far reaching, other jurisdictions have become increasingly receptive to
spoliation actions since Williams was decided in 1983.105 These actions
often are not referred to as independent "spoliation of evidence" torts,
but merely are considered traditional negligence claims in which the in-
jury alleged is the loss of a recovery in an underlying suit rather than the
"expectancy" of recovery in that suit. In fact, only Alaska has followed
California in allowing recovery for an injury to one's "expectancy" of
recovery in the underlying suit.106
103. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 503, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
104. This interpretation of Smith's holding is supported by the California Supreme Court's
comments in Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 74, 729 P.2d 728, 735, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294, 300
(1987). The court stated: "Unlike Gold, and Smith, no compelling public policy exists which
would justify ignoring the threshold requirement of reasonable probability of economic gain
105. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986); Hazen v. Municipality
of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 726 P.2d 565
(1986); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Henry v. Deen, 310
N.C. 75, 310 S.E.2d 326 (1984).
106. Hazen, 718 P.2d at 464.
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B. Problems with Negligent Spoliation in the Attorney- Client Context
As extensive as potential liability under the spoliation tort is, it is
surprising to note that there are no reported cases in which it has been
applied against an attorney by a client. Such an application of the tort
would allow the client to avoid the "suit within a suit" requirement of
legal malpractice claims. This approach, though, would not be without
difficulties. The following section examines, in light of existing case law,
some potential problems and solutions associated with the use of the spo-
liation tort in the attorney-client context.
(1) Preemption of the Field
Smith v. Superior Court 107 went to considerable lengths to reject the
argument that obstruction of justice statutes preempted the cause of ac-
tion for intentional spoliation of evidence.108 This preemption argument,
however, is not at all valid in the case of negligent spoliation of evidence.
Existing obstruction of justice statutes uniformly seem to require inten-
tional conduct for conviction; 10 9 therefore, negligent conduct clearly falls
outside the scope of such statutes.'l 0
In the specific case of negligent spoliation claimed by a plaintiff cli-
ent against his attorney, one might argue that the legal malpractice cause
of action preempts the assertion of negligent spoliation. Legal malprac-
tice claims provide a strong deterrent against negligent conduct by an
107. 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984).
108. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. For other intentional spoliation cases
discussing the issue of preemption by existing penal statutes, see Barrett, 798 F.2d at 575-76;
Spano v. McAvoy, 589 F. Supp. 423, 426 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Petrik v. Monarch Printing
Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248, 260-62, 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321 (1986); Koplin v. Rosel Well
Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 213-15, 734 P.2d 1177, 1182-83 (1987); Henry, 310 N.C. at 87-
90, 310 S.E.2d at 334-36.
109. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D, Obstructing Justice § 7.9 (1989).
110. Nevertheless, at least when the existence of a duty is premised entirely on the penal
statute, one court indicated in dicta that preemption can be a problem even in negligent spolia-
tion cases. The reason given was that the penal statute in question "was enacted to protect the
courts, our system of justice and society in general rather than to benefit any specific class."
Coley v. Ogden Memorial Hosp., 107 A.D.2d 67, 69, 485 N.Y.S.2d 876, 879 (1985). It seems
doubtful that this decision would have been reached had the plaintiff not been seeking to use
the penal statute as the sole source for establishing the existence of a duty in the defendant.
On the other hand, the dissent in Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984), opposed the negligent spoliation action even though a duty clearly had been established.
The dissent noted that the negligent spoliation claim is counter to the rule that "there is no
cognizable independent action for pejury, or for any improper conduct even by a witness,
much less by a party, in an existing lawsuit. Were the rule otherwise, every case would be
subject to constant retrials in the guise of independent actions." Id. at 1314 (Schwartz, C.J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
Both of these cases fail to recognize the distinction between intentional spoliation, which
arguably could be preempted by penal statutes, and negligent spoilation, which clearly is
outside the scope of such statutes.
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attorney, including negligent conduct resulting in the spoliation of evi-
dence. Arguably, the negligent spoliation of evidence cause of action in
this context is redundant.
This argument might be rebutted on two counts. First, the argu-
ment fails to recognize that a malpractice claim does not adequately de-
ter an attorney from negligently spoliating evidence. Spoliation tends to
insulate the attorney from malpractice liability by making the plaintiff's
proof of the merit of the underlying suit more difficult or impossible.
Moreover, it could be argued that negligent spoliation of evidence and
legal malpractice are protecting two distinct interests and so are not du-
plicative. While legal malpractice protects the client's interest in the re-
covery in the underlying suit,'' negligent spoliation protects the client's
expectancy of recovery in the underlying suit. 112
(2) Standard of Care
In determining whether there has been negligent conduct, an appro-
priate standard of care must be recognized. 1,3 Lawyers in the conduct of
their profession are held to the higher "reasonable attorney" standard
rather than merely a "reasonable person" standard. 114 This standard is
used in legal malpractice suits, and it seems appropriate also to use it in
negligent spoliation suits against attorneys. The public policy of encour-
aging quality professional services would be partially undermined if the
law required attorneys to conform to the professional standard of care
for all activities except those that resulted in spoliation of evidence.
Since there are no reported cases of clients suing attorneys for negligent
spoliation, however, the question of which standard of care applies re-
mains open. 1
15
111. 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMrrH, supra note 2, § 16.1, at 890-91.
112. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
113. See generally 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMrrH, supra note 2, § 32 (description of reasonable
person standard).
114. See supra notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text.
115. An interesting situation would have emerged if the plaintiff in Velasco v. Commercial
Bldg. Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1985), had sued her attor-
ney, in addition to the maintenance company, for negligent spoliation. In Velasco, the attorney
placed the shattered remains of a bottle, which was physical evidence for a product liability
suit, into an unmarked brown paper bag and left it on his desk. Maintenance workers dis-
carded the bag and its contents that evening while cleaning the office. This case raises several
issues. Was the attorney negligent? Is this type of conduct properly labelled "professional
conduct," thereby requiring it to conform to the "reasonable attorney" standard? Is there any
real difference in this case between requiring the conduct to be in conformity with that of a
"reasonable attorney" rather than with that of a "reasonable person"? Would one or the other
be less inclined to do what the attorney did here?
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(3) Duty
Negligent spoliation, like any other negligence claim, requires that
the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff not to act in a manner that
causes injury. 116 This requirement has proven to be the most frequent
stumbling block for negligent spoliation claims."17 For example, courts
have held that police officers at accident scenes have no duty to obtain
evidence for use by an injured driver in subsequent civil litigation. 1 8
Similarly, a finding of "no duty" has prevented negligent spoliation
claims against defendants who fail to preserve evidence," 9 even if the
evidence was to be used subsequently in suits against them. 120 And third
parties have been found not to owe a duty to refrain from destroying
evidence that unbeknownst to them was to be used in a civil action.12'
In the specific case of an attorney who negligently spoliates his cli-
ent's evidence, the existence of the attorney's duty not to do so seems, at
first glance, obvious. Such conduct, if it injured the client's underlying
suit, clearly would be subject to attack in a malpractice action. Further-
more, it could be argued that if an attorney has a duty not to spoliate
116. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 30, at 164.
117. See, e.g., Favaloro v. S/S Golden Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 480-81 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
Spano v. McAvoy, 589 F. Supp. 423, 427 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d
18, 23-24, 664 P.2d 137, 140, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 236 (1983); Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 557, 580, 218 Cal. Rptr. 913, 927 (1985); Velasco v. Commercial
Bldg. Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 878, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506-07 (1985); Cald-
well v. City of Philadelphia, 358 Pa. Super. 406, 415-20, 517 A.2d 1296, 1301-03 (1986). The
last four cases cited involved allegations of both negligent and intentional spoliation.
118. See Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 22-28, 664 P.2d at 142-43, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39;
Caldwell, 358 Pa. Super. at 415-19, 517 A.2d at 1301-03.
119. See Parker v. Thyssen Mining Constr. Inc., 428 So. 2d 615, 618 (Ala. 1983).
120. See Favaloro, 687 F. Supp. at 480-81; Spano, 589 F. Supp. at 427 & n.2.
121. See Reid, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 580-81, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 927; Velasco, 169 Cal. App.
3d at 878-79, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07. It is interesting to note that while negligent spoliation
actions frequently have stumbled on the duty question, intentional spoliation claims also fre-
quently have found this issue troublesome. See, e.g., Favaloro, 687 F. Supp. at 481; Spano, 589
F. Supp. at 426-27 & n.2; Parker, 428 So. 2d at 618; Reid, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 580-81, 218 Cal.
Rptr. at 927; Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 212-13, 734 P.2d 1177,
1180-82 (1987); Coley v. Ogden Memorial. Hosp., 107 A.D.2d 67, 69, 485 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878
(1985). While several of these cases involved claims for negligent or intentional spoliation and
dismissed both claims using "no duty" as the rationale, see Favaloro, 687 F. Supp. at 481;
Spano, 589 F. Supp. at 427 & n.2; Parker, 428 So. 2d at 618; Reid, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 580, 218
Cal. Rptr. at 927, other "pure" intentional spoilation claims have been rejected on the same
grounds. See, e.g., Koplin, 241 Kan. at 210-13, 734 P.2d at 1180-82; Coley, 107 A.D.2d at 69,
485 N.Y.S.2d at 878. One would expect the courts to recognize more willingly a duty not to
spoliate evidence intentionally than a duty not to spoliate evidence negligently. Intentional
conduct generally provides the basis for a more expansive finding of liability, than does merely
negligent conduct. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 79, at 560. Nevertheless, "duty"
has proven to be an imposing obstacle for both types of spoliation claims. This fact probably
shows the apprehension felt by courts about imposing liability for the types of injury alleged in
spoliation cases.
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evidence for purposes of a malpractice action, then he also must have a
duty not to do so for purposes of a negligent spoliation action. This rea-
soning, however, is flawed. While an attorney may have a clear duty not
to damage his client's lawsuit negligently, it is less clear that he also has a
duty not to damage his client's expectancy regarding the lawsuit. Thus,
the existence of a duty in negligent spoliation actions against attorneys is
by no means a certainty. By examining duty questions in the spoliation
case law, solutions to potential problems in the attorney-client context
can be posed.
Some of the spoliation cases have indicated that an agreement to
obtain or preserve evidence is crucial to establish the existence of a duty.
A number of courts have refused to follow Smith v. Superior Court,122
disthiguishing it on the ground that it involved an agreement by the de-
fendant to preserve the evidence and that without such an agreement, no
duty exists. 123 Similarly, the court in Coley v. Ogden Memorial Hospi-
tal 124 found no duty by distinguishing that case from Pirocchi v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. 125 based on the absence of an agreement. 126 Other
cases have made explicit reference to the importance of an agreement as a
prerequisite to finding the existence of a duty. 127 An agreement require-
ment would be extremely important if negligent spoliation is claimed
against an attorney. If an agreement is required for a duty to arise, attor-
122. 151 Cal. App. 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984)
123. See Favaloro, 687 F. Supp. at 480-81; Spano, 589 F. Supp. at 427 & n.2; Reid, 173
Cal. App. 3d at 579, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
124. 107 A.D.2d 67, 69, 485 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (1985).
125. 365 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
126. Coley, 107 A.D.2d at 69, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
127. See Koplin, 241 Kan. at 208, 734 P.2d at 1179. On the other hand, there are some
cases that, though finding no duty, have based this determination on factors other than lack of
an agreement. These holdings weaken the theory that an agreement is vital to a finding of
duty. See, eg., Parker v. Thyssen Mining Constr., Inc., 428 So. 2d 615, 618 (Ala. 1983);
Caldwell v. City of Philadelphia, 358 Pa. Super. 406, 413-15, 517 A.2d 1296, 1299-1301
(1986). Other cases have found a duty even though there was no agreement. See Hazen v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463-64 (Alaska 1986); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151
Ariz. 149, 155, 726 P.2d 565, 571 (1986); De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 180 Cal.
App. 3d 782, 794-95, 225 Cal. Rptr. 789, 794-95 (1986); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307,
1312-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Fox v. Cohen, 84 Ill. App. 3d 744, 750, 406 N.E.2d 178,
182 (1980); Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 87-90; 310 S.E.2d 326, 334-35 (1984). Of these cases,
only Hazen was not attributable to a statutory duty or the existence of a "special relationship"
between the parties (Rawlings insurer-insured, De Vera common carrier-passenger). In the
absence of such clear duties, it is therefore still possible the lack of an agreement might have
been fatal to the claims.
Notably, all of the cases finding no duty for lack of an agreement were intentional spolia-
tion claims and all those finding no duty on other grounds were negligent spoliation claims.
This is probably coincidental. There is no relationship between whether the spoliation is negli-
gent or intentional and whether an agreement is required to find a duty. One would expect
that mere negligence would require proof of an agreement, while intentional conduct, being
more egregious, would not necessitate an agreement. The opposite is the case here.
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neys can avoid negligent spoliation liability by simply not entering into
such agreements. This state of affairs would undermine the value of the
negligent spoliation cause of action in general, including its use against
attorneys.
It is more likely that factors other than the presence or absence of an
agreement will be paramount in any negligent spoliation duty analysis.
Most courts have ignored the agreement requirement and have indicated
that duty depends on other factors such as the foreseeability of the harm
incurred, 128 the existence of a statute or regulation on point, 129 the exist-
ence of a "special relationship,"' 130 the defendant's voluntary assumption
of the duty,131 and the status of the spoliator as a party to the underlying
suit. 132
The foreseeability of the harm that occurred is used in some states to
define the scope of the duty of any person to protect against that harm. 
33
If it is foreseeable that harm will result from one's conduct, then one has
a duty to refrain from such conduct.134 This approach, with its relatively
broad definition of duty, benefits plaintiffs by making the duty "hurdle"
easier to surmount. Nevertheless, spoliation cases from jurisdictions fol-
lowing this approach 135 have found the harm resulting from spoliation of
evidence to have been "foreseeable" only on one occasion, and in that
case the finding might have been due to the "special relationship" of
128. De Vera, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 794-95, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95; Reid v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 557, 574-75, 218 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922-23 (1985); Velasco
v. Commerical Bldg. Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 878-79, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506-
07 (1985).
129. Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312-13; Fox, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 748-50, 406 N.E.2d at 181-82;
Henry, 310 N.C. at 87-88, 310 S.E.2d at 334-35.
130. Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 154-55, 726 P.2d at 603 (insurer-insured); Williams v. State, 34
Cal. 3d 18, 24-27, 664 P.2d 137, 140-42, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 234 (1985) (police officer-injured
motorist); Caldwell, 358 Pa. Super. at 412-14, 517 A.2d at 1300 (police officer-injured
motorist).
131. Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 27-28, 664 P.2d at 142-43, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39; Koplin v.
Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 209-10, 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (1987); Caldwell, 358
Pa. Super. at 413-14, 517 A.2d at 1300.
132. Parker v. Thyssen Mining Constr., Inc., 428 So. 2d 615, 618 (Ala. 1983); La Raia v.
Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 118, 121, 722 P.2d 286, 289 (1986); Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312;
Koplin, 241 Kan. at 212, 734 P.2d at 1181.
133. This rule began in California and is now followed by eight states. PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 12, § 62, at 433. The test actually has seven components, but "foreseeability"
is the basic test. 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 895, at 265 (9th ed. 1988).
134. PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 12, § 43, at 281.
135. De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 180 Cal. App. 3d 782, 794-95, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 789, 794-95 (1986); Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 557, 575,
218 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922-23 (1985); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 169 Cal.
App. 3d 874, 878-79, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506-07 (1985). The jurisdictions following the fore-
seeability approach are: California, Hawaii, Colorado, District of Columbia, Rhode Island,
New Hampshire, Louisiana, Alaska, Missouri.
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common carrier to passenger. 136 These cases suggest judicial reluctance
to find a duty in spoliation cases without factors other than foreseeability
of harm and probably indicate the courts' general discomfort with the
spoliation of evidence cause of action.
In the specific case of a spoliation claim against an attorney, though,
foreseeability alone might be considered sufficient. The attorney's posi-
tion is unique in two important respects that warrant the imposition of a
duty not to spoliate evidence when a foreseeable harm results. First, an
attorney is a vital part of the justice system 137 and should not act in a
manner that hinders its proper functioning. Second, an attorney is a fi-
duciary of his client138 and therefore should be required to meet the most
exacting standards of conduct in all dealings with the client. For these
reasons, it seems that if ever "foreseeability" alone should be sufficient to
find a duty in a spoliation case, it should be in a case involving a client
suing her attorney.
Regardless of how the courts decide the foreseeability question, a
client suing her attorney for negligent spoliation has other means of win-
ning on the duty issue. Thus, some courts have-found that the existence
of a statute or regulation on point, in addition to foreseeability, is suffi-
cient to establish a duty. 139 Frequently, these cases involve statutes or
regulations requiring hospitals to keep and preserve medical records for
their patients. 140
In the attorney-client context, a duty not to spoliate might be in-
ferred from discovery statutes or rules of professional conduct. For ex-
ample, some discovery statutes provide for sanctions for failing to
comply with discovery orders whether through willful refusal or mere
negligence.141 Analogously, one could argue that a lawyer has a duty not
136. De Vera, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 794-95, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95.
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preamble, A Lawyer's Re-
sponsibilities (1984) (calling lawyers "officer[s] of the legal system" and stating that "[l]awyers
play a vital role in the preservation of society"); see also id. Rule 8.4 ("It is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to... (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.").
138. R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 2.
139. De Vera, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 792-97, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 793-95; Bondu v. Gurvich,
473 So. 2d 1307, 1312-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Fox v. Cohen, 84 111. App. 3d 744, 748-50,
406 N.E.2d 178, 181-82 (1980); Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 87-88, 310 S.E.2d 326, 334-35
(1984); see also Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248, 258-59, 501 N.E.2d
1312, 1319 (1986) (stating in dicta that a statute or a Supreme.Court rule would be sufficient to
establish duty).
140. See, eg., Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312-13 (duty imposed by regulations of Health and
Rehabilitation services); Fox, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 748-50, 406 N.E.2d at 181-82 (duty imposed by
licensing requirements promulgated by Department of Health); Henry, 310 N.C. at 87-88, 310
S.E.2d at 334-35 (duty imposed by rule setting out consequences for parties who refuse to
allow discovery).
141. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 37.01 advisory committee's note (West Supp. 1990)
(explicitly rejecting "willfulness" as a controlling factor in sanctions determination).
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to hinder the discovery process through spoliation of client's evidence.
Moreover, both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct arguably impose a duty on the at-
torney not to spoliate a client's evidence. For example, Model Rule 1.15,
dealing with the attorney's safekeeping of a client's property, indicates
that the attorney should "treat the property ... with special care and
meet the highest standards of accountability." 142 Both model statutes
also contain provisions requiring professionally competent conduct 143
and prohibiting conduct that obstructs the administration of justice. 144
From these provisions, one can argue that since spoliation of evidence is
incompetent conduct and tends to obstruct the administration of justice,
a duty is impliedly created in an attorney not to spoliate evidence.
Another basis for finding a duty is the so-called "special relation-
ship" doctrine. Many courts considering a spoliation claim have focused
on the existence or lack of a "special relationship" in determining
whether to impose a duty.145 The special relationship issue arises when
the defendant's alleged wrong was a failure to act and this failure has
caused injury.146 Following general tort principles, courts have been re-
luctant to impose liability for merely failing to act and have tended not to
find a duty to act affirmatively absent some "special relationship."' 147
The "special relationship" issue is encountered frequently in spolia-
tion cases because the wrongful "conduct" at issue can often be charac-
terized as a "failure to act." Typically, the defendant has failed to
procure evidence for the plaintiff and the question becomes whether a
special relationship existed that created a duty to do so. So far, the
142. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Legal Background, at
166 (1984).
143. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-1 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
144. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(A) (1983).
145. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 154-55, 726 P.2d 565, 603 (1986); Williams v.
State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 21, 664 P.2d 137, 140-42, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 237-30 (1983); De Vera v.
Long Beach Pub. Tranp. Co., 180 Cal. App. 3d 782, 792-95, 225 Cal. Rptr. 789, 793-95 (1986);
Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 213, 734 P.2d 1177, 1182 (1987); Cald-
well v. City of Philadelphia, 358 Pa. Super. 406, 412-19, 517 A.2d 1296, 1299-1303 (1986). Cf.
Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 557, 573-76, 218 Cal. Rptr. 913,
922-23 (1985) ("special relationship" doctrine not applicable when harm is clearly
unforeseeable).
146. See, e.g., Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 21-22, 664 P.2d at 138, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (failure
of police officer to obtain evidence at scene of accident); De Vera, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 788-90,
225 Cal. Rptr. at 790-91 (failure of bus driver to obtain evidence at scene of accident in which
his passengers were injured); Caldwell, 358 Pa. Super. at 409-10, 517 A.2d at 1298 (failure of
police officer at scene to obtain identity of driver who struck and injured pedestrian).
147. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 56, at 373-75.
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courts have been slow to use the "special relationship" doctrine to find a
duty under these circumstances.
14 8
In the attorney- client context, spoliation claims might frequently in-
volve an attorney's "failure to act" to procure evidence through discov-
ery or investigation. The client can argue that an attorney has an
affirmative duty to act in these cases. The attorney-client relationship
probably is "special" since an attorney is in a position of trust and con-
trol relative to the client. Indeed, the law recognizes this status by its
imposition of a fiduciary obligation on attorneys. 149 Moreover, the attor-
ney's act of taking a client's case could be considered a voluntary under-
taking that induces detrimental reliance by the client. Such
undertakings, under general tort principles, often have been sufficient to
create a "special relationship."1i50
The spoliation cases also have indicated that the existence of a duty
might depend on whether the spoliator was a party to the underlying suit
or would have stood to gain by the destruction of the evidence. 15' No-
tions of fairness dictate that the law should be quicker to find a duty not
to spoliate evidence on the part of those who stand to gain from such
conduct, typically parties to the underlying suit. For example, a com-
mon situation in which a duty has been found involves spoliation of med-
ical records by hospitals and doctors to protect themselves in a
malpractice action.' 52 The flip side of such cases is seen when no duty is
found because the spoliator, like the plaintiff, stood to lose by the spolia-
tion of evidence. These cases have involved employers who discard phys-
ical evidence to be used by an injured employee in a subsequent product
148. See cases cited supra note 145. One case, Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241
Kan. 206, 734 P.2d 1177 (1987), dealt with an employer who had discarded evidence that his
employee could have used in a product liability suit. The court phrased the duty issue in terms
of "the duty to preserve," rather than the duty not to discard, evidence and then refused to find
a duty unless a special relationship existed. Id at 212-13, 734 P.2d at 1181-82. It reasoned
that an "intolerable burden" would be imposed on an employer by requiring him "to preserve
all possible physical evidence that might somehow be utilized" in a lawsuit. Id. at 213, 734
P.2d at 1182. This holding illustrates the courts' reluctance to impose an affirmative duty to
obtain or preserve evidence. Though this particular case easily could have been analyzed in
terms of a duty not to destroy evidence, the court's discomfort with the spoliation tort was
apparent as it instead focused on the defendant's failure to preserve evidence (that is, its failure
to act) and consequently found no duty. Id. at 212-13, 734 P.2d at 1181, 1182.
149. See I R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 2, § 11.1. at 631.
150. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 56, at 378-82.
151. See Parker v. Thyssen Mining Constr. Co., 428 So. 2d 615, 618 (Ala. 1983); La Raia
v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 118, 121, 722 P.2d 286, 289 (1986); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d
1307, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206,
212, 734 P.2d 1177, 1181 (1987).
152. See Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1309; Fox v. Cohen, 84 Ill. App. 3d 744, 745, 406 N.E.2d
178, 179 (1980); Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 79, 310 S.E.2d 326, 329-30 (1984).
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liability suit. 153 In these situations, the employer has an incentive not to
impair the evidence since the lack of evidence would damage the em-
ployer's own chances of recovery for the lost work, time, and money or
for the worker's compensation payments that resulted from the injury. 1
54
In the attorney-client setting, one could argue that the attorney has
nothing to gain and everything to lose by damaging his client's evidence
and that this fact militates against a finding of duty. The attorney not
only stands to lose the underlying case as a result of the spoliation, but
also would lose any contingency fee and injure her own professional rep-
utation. Whether this argument will convince courts not to find a duty
on the part of the attorney turns on how much weight is given to the
other factors that are considered in a determination of duty: the existence
of an agreement, the foreseeability of harm, a statute on point, a "special
relationship," or the voluntary assumption of the duty by the defend-
ant. 1 55  For example, some courts might give considerable weight to the
special relationship between attorney and client or the existence of statu-
tory duties and use these as the basis for finding a duty, regardless of the
attorney's interest in not spoliating the evidence.
(4) Defining Spoliation
A negligent spoliation action obviously must include a showing that
evidence has been spoliated. But it is unclear as to precisely what consti-
tutes "spoliation" of evidence.1 56 The common thread running through
spoliation cases is that the evidence was rendered useless or inaccessible.
Obviously, if physical evidence actually is destroyed, it is spoliated.157
Another situation that amounts to spoliation is when a fleeting tempo-
rary phenomenon or condition cannot be testified to because one failed to
check for it or record it when it existed.' 58 Similarly, the cases indicate
that lost physical evidence is spoliated. 5 9
153. See Parker, 428 So. 2d at 617; Koplin, 241 Kan. at 208, 734 P.2d at 1179; Coley v.
Ogden Memorial Hosp., 107 A.D.2d 67, 68-69, 485 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877-78 (1985).
154. See, e.g., Parker, 428 So. 2d at 618; Koplin, 241 Kan. at 212, 734 P.2d at 1181.
155. See supra notes 116-49 and accompanying text.
156. The dictionary definition is no help: "The destruction of evidence." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1257 (5th ed. 1979).
157. See, e.g., Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 557, 568, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 913, 918 (1985) (wrecked car sold for scrap); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance
Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 876, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 505 (1985) (shattered bottle thrown away);
Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 208, 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (1987) (T-
clamp disposed of or destroyed).
158. See, e.g., Alger v. City of Mukilteo, 107 Wash. 2d 541, 545, 730 P.2d 1333, 1335
(1987) (negligent operation of tape recorder); Williams v. State of Cal., 34 Cal. 3d 18, 21-22,
664 P.2d 137, 138, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 234 (1983) (failure to check whether brake drum was
hot at scene of accident).
159. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 494, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831
(1984) (van dealer "destroyed, lost, or transferred" van parts to be used as evidence); Bondu v.
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A more difficult question is how "lost" or "inaccessible" the physi-
cal evidence must be to be spoliated. 160 The only cases dealing with pur-
portedly lost physical evidence involved defendants in the underlying suit
losing physical evidence that was to be used against them.1 61 In these
situations the courts, rightly, did not question the plaintiff's contention
that the physical evidence could not be utilized. When the physical evi-
dence is not under the defendant's control, however, the plaintiff's access
to the evidence might be raised as an important issue of fact since evi-
dence that is accessible cannot be considered spoliated.
In the attorney-client context, spoliation is more likely to be alleged
from the loss of witness testimony when, for example, the attorney negli-
gently allows the passage of time to make the location of a witness impos-
sible. 162 In such a case, the question of spoliation is not as clear as in a
case of lost physical evidence. Physical evidence, once "lost," is likely to
be subsequently destroyed or become hopelessly untraceable. Witnesses,
on the other hand, unless deceased, continue to exist and are more easily
traceable. The problem is purely a matter of the costs required to con-
duct a search. An attorney defendant could therefore question whether
the "loss" of a witness amounts to spoliation.
163
Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1309-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (hospital "lost and/or de-
stroyed" medical records).
160. One commentator has urged that only destroyed evidence should be considered
spoliated. She states: "Once evidence is destroyed, it can never be recovered. Concealed evi-
dence, on the other hand, may later resurface, and a new trial can be ordered." Comment,
Spoliation: Civil Liability for Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 206 (1985)
(authored by Andrea H. Rouse).
161. See Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 494, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831; Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So.
2d 1307, 1309-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 150 I1. App.
3d 248, 249-50, 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1313 (1986); cf Fox v. Cohen, 84 111. App. 3d 744, 745, 406
N.E.2d 178, 179 (1980) (negligently losing, misplacing, or destroying medical records).
162. Another example would be the case where an attorney fails to pursue discovery in a
timely manner and in the meantime a witness dies, becomes deathly ill, becomes incompetent
to testify, or simply forgets the relevant testimony.
163. The only cases with a lost witness allegation shed little light on the issue. See Wil-
liams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 664 P.2d 137, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1983); De Vera v. Long Beach
Pub. Transp. Co., 180 Cal. App. 3d 782, 225 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1986); Caldwell v. City of Phila-
delphia, 358 Pa. Super. 406, 517 A.2d 1296 (1986). Of course, testimony that has been forgot-
ten by a potential witness is clearly spoliated notwithstanding the traceability of the witness.
Another type of spoliation question could arise in situations in which existing evidence, physi-
cal or testimonial, is made less valuable due to the attorney's negligence. For example, an
attorney's negligent failure to object to the admissibility of an opponent's evidence may under-
mine the value of existing evidence. How useless must the existing evidence become before it is
"spoliated"? Is this a type of harm that is better left to a professional negligence claim?
Again, little can be derived from existing case law, but these questions certainly could be posed
in future spoliation suits.
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(5) Cause-in-Fact and Proximate Cause
A negligence cause of action requires that the negligent conduct be a
cause of the claimed injury. I 64 Still, not every act of negligence that
causes harm results in liability. Liability is imposed only when the causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury is sufficiently
"proximate" to warrant it.165 The threshold requirement that the negli-
gent conduct cause the injury is referred to as "cause-in-fact."' 66 The
second requirement, that the cause be sufficiently "proximate" to the in-
jury to warrant the imposition of liability, is referred to as "proximate
cause."
a. Cause-in-Fact
In a legal malpractice suit, when the plaintiff's interest in the under-
lying suit is being protected, the plaintiff must prove that but for the
attorney's negligence, the underlying suit would have been more success-
ful. 167 In other words, the plaintiff must prove a "suit within a suit.' 1 68
When it is uncertain whether the underlying suit would have turned out
more favorably in the absence of attorney negligence, courts will dismiss
malpractice actions on the ground that the damage claimed is too
speculative. 6
9
By contrast, a negligent spoliation action recognizes the plaintiff's
expectancy of recovery iii the underlying suit as a protected interest. 170
It would seem that proving the merit of the underlying case would not be
necessary since one's expectancy of recovery can be injured even if the
odds of recovery are in fact remote. 171 Therefore, it would make sense to
require only proof that the negligent spoliation caused injury to the
plaintiff's expectancy of recovery, and not to the recovery itself.172
California is the only state to have completely abolished the "suit
within a suit" requirement in spoliation cases.173 A corollary to this po-
164. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 30, at 165.
165. Id. § 42, at 272-73.
166. A "cause-in-fact" also often is referred to as the "but for" cause. The terms are
synonymous.
167. 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 412.
168. See supra note 4.
169. 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 2, § 16.3, at 894-96. Uncertainty as to the fact
of damages should be distinguished from uncertainty as to the amount of damages. The for-
mer usually is grounds for failure of a legal malpractice claim, while the latter is not. Id. at
894.
170. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
171. The plaintiff in Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League, 49 Cal. App. 3d 365, 122
Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975), recovered for the interference with his chances of winning an election
even though he lost the election by a four to one margin.
172. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 130, at 1005 n.25.
173. See supra note 97-105 and accompanying text.
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sition was the rejection in Smith v. Superior Court 174 of the view that
until an unfavorable judgment on the underlying suit was reached, no
injury had been sustained. 175 This position was motivated by a desire for
procedural efficiency. As the Smith court stated, the "practical" reasons
for allowing the spoliation claim to be brought together with the underly-
ing claim included "needless duplication of effort, two trials involving
much the same evidence, time and expense imposed on litigants and the
judicial system, and a jury uniquely equipped to determine how the
Smiths were harmed."
176
Other courts have disagreed with Smith and have required that the
underlying suit reach an unfavorable judgment before a spoliation claim
may proceed.177 This position is inconsistent with the notion of recovery
for the lost expectation. 17  These courts implicitly recognize the view
that without the actual loss of the underlying suit, the plaintiff has not
yet been injured and therefore has alleged damages that are too specula-
tive to warrant relief. This position undermines the value of spoliation of
evidence as an independent tort. If the plaintiff must prove an actual loss
of recovery in order to provide sufficient certainty as to damages, the
plaintiff might as well bring a legal malpractice claim.
In spoliation actions against attorneys, a negligent attorney could
argue that Smith is not applicable to negligent spoliation claims because
of the potentially limitless liability that could result if mere negligence
constituted the basis of a claim for injury to an interest as intangible as
an expectancy. Thus, although cases of intentional spoliation might war-
rant disposing of the plaintiff's need to show the merit of the underlying
suit, negligent spoliation, which is less egregious in nature, arguably does
not.179 Moreover, a defendant attorney could argue that the commenta-
tors and courts have generally concurred that an essential element of
other interference-based torts180 is the probability that the plaintiff could
174. 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984).
175. Id. at 498, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
176. Id. at 503, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
177. See Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Petrik v.
Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248, 262, 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321 (1986); Fox v.
Cohen, 84 Ill. App. 3d 744, 751, 406 N.E.2d 178, 183 (1980).
178. See Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 503, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
i79. Such reasoning by the courts also has caused them to be much slower to accept spec-
ulative damages for negligent interference with a prospective business advantage as compared
to an intentional interference with a prospective business advantage. See 5 B. WrTKIN, supra
note 133, §§ 659-63. Similarly, courts recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress
long before the analogous negligent tort was recognized. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766C comment a (1979) (explaining why there has been no general recognition of
liability for negligent interference with contract or prospective contractual relations).
180. Wilson v. Loew's, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 183, 190, 298 P.2d 152, 158 (1956); Camp-
bell v. Rayburn, 129 Cal. App. 2d 232, 235, 276 P.2d 671, 672 (1954); Goldman v. Feinberg,
130 Conn. 671, 674-75, 37 A.2d 355, 356 (1944); Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263
N.Y. 386, 392, 189 N.E. 463, 469 (1934); Collatz v. Fox Wis. Amusement Corp., 239 Wis. 156,
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realize the interest with which defendant has interfered and that this
probability of realization should also be an element of negligent spolia-
tion causes of action.
These arguments, however, are undercut by Youst v. Longo,' 8' a
1987 California Supreme Court case. Youst implicitly supported Smith's
abandonment of the "suit within a suit" requirement for intentional spo-
liation claims and provided the basis for an inference that this require-
ment should also be abandoned in negligent spoliation cases.'
8 2 Youst
involved a racehorse owner who sued another owner when the latter's
horse was allegedly intentionally or negligently steered into the path of
the plaintiff's horse during a race, causing the plaintiff's horse to lose its
stride and any possibility of winning the cash purse in the race.' 8 3 The
plaintiff urged that the holding in Gold and Smith regarding recovery for
the prospective loss of a political campaign and of a civil lawsuit should
be applied to allow recovery for the loss of a horse race. 184 The appellate
court did so, but the California Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that Smith and Gold were distinguishable from Youst:
Next to Gold, Smith may represent the most speculative advantage
that has heretofore been recognized by the California appellate courts.
Just as Gold protected the fundamental right to a fair election, Smith
based its ruling on the importance of preserving the integrity of civil
litigation. We do not believe that comparably important public policy
considerations exist here ....
Unlike Gold and Smith, no compelling public policy exists which
would justify ignoring the threshold requirement of reasonable
probability of economic gain in the context of a sporting event.1
8 5
The supreme court implicitly approved Smith's indifference towards rea-
sonable probability of economic gain by emphasizing the public policy
rationale behind the spoliation of evidence tort. The court's reasoning
suggests that both intentional and negligent spoliation causes of action
are exempted from the "threshold requirement of reasonable probability
of economic gain." 186 By focusing on public policy as the justification for
158-59, 300 N.W. 162, 164 (1941); 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 6.11, at 345 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER & KEETON, SUpra note 12, § 129, at 978, § 130, at 1006;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B Special Note on Liability for Interference With
Other Prospective Benefits of a Noncontractual Nature (1979); id. at § 774B comment d; 5 B.
WITKIN, supra note 133, §§ 644, 664; but see Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 494,
503, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (1984); Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League, 49 Cal. App. 3d
365, 375, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739-40 (1975); Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19
WM. & MARY L. REV. 719, 725 (1978).
181. 43 Cal. 3d 64, 729 P.2d 728, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1987).
182. Id. at 71-74, 729 P.2d at 732-35, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 298-300.
183. Id. at 68, 729 P.2d at 730-31, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
184. Id. at 72-73, 729 P.2d at 733, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
185. Id. at 73-74, 729 P.2d at 734-35, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 74, 729 P.2d at 735, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
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the exemption, the court made the level of intent of the defendant less
relevant.
Moreover, Youst's public policy rationale is all the more applicable
in cases in which an attorney has negligently spoliated evidence. Attor-
neys are "a vital part of the legal system" 187 and as officers of the court
are in a unique position to undermine the smooth functioning of that
system through conduct that spoliates evidence. Consequently, the pub-
lic policy of preventing attorneys from spoliating evidence is greater than
the policy of preventing the general public from doing so. It would seem,
therefore, that negligent spoliation, like intentional spoliation, should be
exempted from the "suit within a suit" requirement.
Thus, at least in California, the negligent spoliation cause of action
provides a valuable alternative to the traditional legal malpractice claim.
When evidence has been spoliated through the negligence of an attorney,
the legal malpractice plaintiff would face the daunting task of proving the
underlying suit to obtain recovery. The negligent spoliation plaintiff, on
the other hand, does not have to do so.
A reading of the non-California spoliation cases finds little discus-
sion of whether the likelihood of recovery in the underlying suit must be
shown. Because the cases frequently decide that no duty exists to pre-
serve or obtain evidence, 88 or because the underlying suit already has
reached judgment, 18 9 often there is no need for courts to reach the issue
of the likelihood of recovery. Of the few non-California cases that allow
spoliation claims to be brought before the underlying suit has reached
judgment, none gives any indication of whether or to what extent recov-
ery in the underlying suit must have been likely. 190 It is doubtful,
though, that these courts intend to go as far-as California has in eliminat-
ing the need to show the likelihood of recovery when spoliation of evi-
dence is involved. 191 It seems more likely that non-California courts, if
and when they address the issue in future spoliation cases, will look to
existing interference torts192 to provide a solution by analogy. For exam-
ple, in jurisdictions recognizing a tort for interference with prospective
economic advantage, the courts have refused to extend liability to com-
187. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-7 (1980).
188. See, eg., note 117.
189. See, eg., Petrik v. Monarch Printing Co., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248, 262, 501 N.E.2d 1312,
1321 (1986) (court did not reach spoliation issue because plaintiff's underlying suit was unsuc-
cessful and plaintiff failed to plead nexus between the failure of the suit and the destruction of
his business records).
190. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Bondu v. Gurvich,
473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 310 S.E.2d 326
(1984).
191. See supra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
192. Among the existing torts are: interference with prospective economic advantage, in-
terference with prospective contractual relations, or interference with prospective business
relations.
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pensate for a lost expectancy of an economic gain that probably would
not have been realized in the absence of any interference. 193 Such hold-
ings easily could be applied to reject spoliation claims since the lost ex-
pectancy of recovery in a forthcoming lawsuit is speculative.
The negligent spoliation plaintiff who sues his attorney without the
benefit of California law could face this obstacle. To the extent that the
underlying suit's merit must be shown with certainty, the spoliation ac-
tion loses its utility. The plaintiff's attorney must try to convince the
judge that the public policy argument of Smith and Youst is a valid
ground for distinguishing the spoliation tort from other interference torts
and, therefore, for eliminating the need to prove the underlying suit.
b. Proximate Causation
Once it has been established that the defendant's negligent conduct
was a cause of the plaintiff's injury, the question remains whether the
defendant should be held legally responsible for that injury.1 94 Courts
apply the concept of "proximate cause" to limit liability even though
cause-in-fact is not in doubt. 195 A determination of "no proximate
cause" is a legal conclusion that, even though the defendant's negligence
caused harm, he will not be held liable for that harm. The precise rea-
sons for not imposing liability vary with the circumstances, but the deci-
sions are grounded in policy considerations. 1
96
Proximate cause is simply another way of asking if the defendant
had a duty to protect the plaintiff from the event that occurred. 197 Both
concepts involve legal conclusions of whether liability will be imposed
when the defendant's negligence is a cause of harm to the plaintiff. 198 In
practice, however, courts tend to use "proximate cause" or "duty" to
deal with certain kinds of situations:
[Courts] confine the word "duty" to questions of the existence of some
relation between the defendant and the plaintiff which gives rise to the
obligation of conduct in the first instance, and ... deal with the con-
nection between that obligation, once it has arisen, and the conse-
quences which have followed in the language of "proximate cause."' 199
In the negligent spoliation case law, duty analysis is much more fre-
quently encountered than proximate cause analysis. 2° Perhaps because
of the novelty of the spoliation tort, the courts tend to focus on whether
193. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 130, at 1006.
194. Id. § 42, at 272-73.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 274.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 275.
200. For a sampling of some of the cases employing a "duty" analysis, see supra notes 113-
55 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 41
NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
the law should recognize an obligation owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff in the first instance, rather than on the connection between the
defendant's obligation and the harm incurred. Since lack of duty is most
frequently the fatal flaw in negligent spoliation cases, "proximate cause"
analysis is often unnecessary. The question whether there is a sufficient
connection between the defendant's breach of his obligation and the
harm to warrant liability typically does not arise. Rather, the prelimi-
nary question of whether there is an obligation in the first place controls
most negligent spoliation cases.
In the specific context of negligent spoliation actions against attor-
neys, however, it is possible that proximate cause, rather than duty, will
be the stumbling block. As mentioned previously, the attorney occupies
a position of trust and power toward the client and also is an integral
part of the justice system.20 1 While it is certainly possible that courts will
question the existence of an obligation to refrain from injuring the client
or frustrating the administration of justice, it seems more likely that
courts will focus on whether the connection between the obligation and
the injury incurred is sufficient to amount to proximate cause.
Policy considerations could sway courts using a proximate cause
analysis to protect attorneys from liability. In some cases, an attorney's
negligent conduct might consist of discretionary acts resulting in spolia-
tion of evidence that courts may not be inclined to second-guess. For
example, an attorney might negligently fail to object to testimony that
impairs the value of existing evidence. Or, an attorney might negligently
render evidence inaccessible by failing to pursue discovery. An argument
based on proximate cause could be made that even though the negligent
conduct of the attorney has caused spoliation of evidence and injury, im-
posing liability would encourage undesirable professional conduct in
other attorneys. Moreover, if attorneys are made vulnerable to negligent
spoliation suits for failures to object, they might forgo the tactical advan-
tages of not objecting because of the threat of a negligent spoliation law-
suit. In the case of failure to pursue discovery, attorneys might proceed
with discovery even if it is of minimal likely value, out of fear of spolia-
tion claims. 202 Failure to pursue adequate discovery or to object prop-
erly would be grounds for a legal malpractice claim when damage to the
underlying suit results. But in a negligent spoliation action, in which
injury to a mere expectancy of recovery is alleged, it is possible that these
policy considerations will prove decisive and that the spoliation claim
will be denied.
201. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
202. Frivolous discovery requests are violative of attorney ethical standards. See MODEL
RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d) (1984).
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(6) Uncertainty of Amount of Damages
Tort plaintiffs must establish not only the fact of damages, but also
the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.20 3 This element of the
spoliation tort has been troubling for courts.2°4 How, after all, does one
calculate the damages suffered to the expectancy of recovery? Other in-
terference torts generally have limited recovery to "expectancies" that
were susceptible to quantification.2 0 5 Thus, actions for interference with
a contractual relation or a prospective contractual relation have used the
value of the lost contract to calculate damages. 20 6 Actions for interfer-
ence with an economic advantage have been limited to the business field
that provides a background of business experience from which to esti-
mate the value of the loss. 2 0 7
The spoliation tort, by contrast, involves a situation in which the
value of the interest interfered with, the expectancy of the underlying
lawsuit, cannot be determined easily. Even when all relevant evidence is
available, damage claims can be difficult to calculate. Furthermore, valu-
ing the plaintiff's expectancy of recovery, not the recovery itself, causes
more problems. When evidence has been spoliated, the difficulty of valu-
ation increases.
Smith v. Superior Court208 dealt with this problem by following
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. 20 9 and lowering
the requisite degree of certainty from "reasonable certainty" to a "just
and reasonable inference" as to the amount of damages.210 The applica-
tion of the Story doctrine to spoliation actions against attorneys similarly
would make certainty of damages less problematic. Defendant attorneys
203. D. DOBBS, supra note 91, § 3.1, at 135.
204. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835
(1984) ("[tlhe most troubling aspect"); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248,
260, 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1320 (1986) ("[t]he most difficult aspect").
205. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 180, § 6.11, at 345.
206. Id.
207. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 130, at 1006.
208. 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984).
209. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
210. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. Another position that has been sug-
gested argues that uncertainty as to damages should not preclude recovery entirely. Instead,
the potential recovery should be discounted by the probability that it would have been re-
ceived. Schaefer, supra note 180, at 725. This position was rejected by the California Supreme
Court in Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 76 n.8, 729 P.2d 728, 737 n.8, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294, 302
n.8 (1987), in the context of an interference with prospective economic advantage claim. The
court noted that this discounting calculation is already incorporated into the damage computa-
tion. Notwithstanding the supreme court's rejection of this position, it seems an appropriate
way of recognizing the value of the lost recovery while also limiting the damages by taking
account of the likelihood of its being realized. It does not, however, solve the problem of
determining the amount of the potential recovery, the value before discounting for the
probability of recovery, when critical evidence needed to do so is unavailable. See Petrik v.
Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248, 260-62, 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1320-21 (1986).
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could argue, however, that in certain situations Story should not apply.
One might argue that when a plaintiff client was the defendant in the
underlying suit, the underlying suit should be tried rather than allowing
the plaintiff to make a "just and reasonable inference" of spoliation dam-
ages as Story would permit. A plaintiff client who was a defendant in the
underlying case can use the adverse judgment against him in that suit as
the basis for determining damages for a spoliation claim, thereby elimi-
nating the uncertainty that justified Story's "inference" of damages in the
subsequent spoliation action.211 Of course, the desirability of this argu-
ment depends on which approach, the jury's "inference" as to the loss of
the expectancy or the actual loss of the underlying suit, yields the more
favorable damage total. Thus, if the loss in the underlying suit would be
great, the spoliation plaintiff should argue for using the underlying suit as
the measure of damages, and the spoliation defendant should argue for
applying Story's inference of damages. The reverse would be true where
liability in the underlying suit is expected to be minimal.
Conclusion
The "suit within a suit" requirement of legal malpractice law can
operate harshly against plaintiffs, especially when crucial evidence has
been spoliated by the attorney's negligence. Judicial and scholarly solu-
tions generally have involved tinkering with the burden of proving the
merit of the underlying suit in certain narrow circumstances. While
these approaches are effective in remedying the harshness of the "suit
within a suit" requirement, they have not been adopted widely. Courts
are more comfortable following the weight of authority than implement-
ing relatively novel approaches.
When attorney negligence has caused spoliation of evidence, a grow-
ing number of states allow the client to sue for negligent spoliation of
evidence. 212 The negligent spoliation.plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant owed a duty not to spoliate evidence, that the defendant negli-
gently spoliated evidence, and that between the spoliation caused the
alleged injury. In most states, this last requirement means showing that,
but for the spoliation of evidence, the underlying suit would have been
more successful. This standard is akin to the "suit within a suit" require-
ment of legal malpractice actions and can operate just as harshly, since
proving the underlying suit usually is impossible if crucial evidence has
been spoliated.
211. The underlying plaintiff, unlike the underlying defendant, is not in a position to ob-
tain a dollar figure for the loss caused by the spoliation. The underlying plaintiff could simply
recover nothing in the underlying suit and the question of how much would have been recov-
ered in the absence of spoliation is still left unanswered.
212. See supra note 105.
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California is the only state that has no "suit within a suit" require-
ment for spoliation actions. The Gold, Smith, and Youst cases indicate
that when there is a "compelling public policy" 2 13 to discourage certain
conduct that interferes with a prospective gain a plaintiff may recover for
the interference even without showing that the prospective gain would
have been realized had it not been for the defendant's interference. This
rule makes the negligent spoliation action in California a useful alterna-
tive claim against negligent attorneys. While the legal malpractice cause
of action requires proving the "suit within a suit," the spoliation action
totally avoids this requirement.
The spoliation action against attorneys, however, is not without its
problems. Defendant attorneys might argue that the availability of a
legal malpractice cause of action makes the application of negligent spoli-
ation against attorneys unnecessary. They might argue that an attorney's
duty not to spoliate evidence only applies to conduct that actually injures
the underlying suit but not conduct that merely impairs the client's ex-
pectancy of a favorable result in the underlying suit. The defendant at-
torney could point to the spoliation case law to argue that some
agreement, statute, or special relationship is required to create a duty.
Moreover, the case law could be used to argue that the attorney, as a
"nonparty" spoliator of evidence, should not be subject to a duty not to
spoliate since he has no interest in destroying the evidence. The defend-
ant attorney might argue for the "reasonable person" rather than the
"reasonable attorney" standard and attempt to use this lower standard of
care to avoid a determination that he acted negligently. In addition,
questions of what constitutes "spoliation" of evidence might be raised in
defense, especially if the "spoliated" evidence is witness testimony rather
than physical evidence.
Outside California, the "suit within a suit" requirement provides de-
fendant attorneys with an array of defenses; any defense to the underly-
ing suit could be used to defeat the subsequent spoliation suit. Proximate
cause could be a problem in some circumstances. If the spoliating con-
duct involves the exercise of professional discretion, imposing spoliation
liability might have the undesirable consequence of chilling the uninhib-
ited exercise of such professional discretion by other attorneys. Finally,
defendant attorneys might argue that the amount of damages for negli-
gent spoliation cannot be calculated with sufficient certainty to allow the
claim. In some cases, they might further argue that Story's reduced stan-
dard of certainty is not applicable.
The use of negligent spoliation of evidence in the attorney-client
context is untested. While the preceding has discussed some potential
problems with such an application of this new tort, none of these
problems is insurmountable. It will be for future malpractice plaintiffs to
213. Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 74, 729 P.2d 728, 735, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294, 300 (1987).
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determine exactly how far the spoliation tort can go toward remedying
attorney negligence that might otherwise be insulated from liability by
the "suit within a suit" requirement.

